FIRST
DIVISION
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FERNANDO
S. DIZON,
Petitioner, - versus - PEOPLE OF
THE Respondent. |
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G.R.
No. 144026 Present: PANGANIBAN, CJ Chairperson, YNARES-SANTIAGO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. Promulgated: June
15, 2006 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure assailing the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Decision[2] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Petitioner was charged with
falsification of a private document under the following information:
That on or about and sometime in the month of July,
1986, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Fernando
S. Dizon, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously commit falsification of a private document, to wit: Said
accused, with intent to damage Titan Construction Corporation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously prepare a document, to wit: a
certification dated July 10, 1986, by stating and making it appear in said
document that the First United Construction Corporation has undertaken building
construction, sewage, water, and other civil works, for the following projects
of Titan Construction Corporation:
Title Cost
1. Calapan Super Area Shop P 8,900,000.00
2.
3. Catarman
Super Area Shop 12,000,000.00
and that the same was executed and signed by the President
of Titan Construction Corporation, when in truth and in fact, as said accused
well knew that said certification was not issued nor authorized to be issued by
Titan Construction Corporation and that it is false because First United
Construction Corporation never had any participation of the projects listed
therein which were undertaken by Titan Construction Corporation and that the
signature appearing in said certification as being that of Titan Construction
Corporation’s President is false and a forgery since it was not signed by its
President, to the damage and prejudice of Titan Construction Corporation.[3]
Under arraignment on
This criminal case against petitioner
originated from a civil action[4]
for prohibition, damages with petition for the issuance of temporary
restraining order/preliminary injunction filed by Titan Construction
Corporation and Fernando M. Sopot on
A witness for the prosecution, Atty.
Jaime Linsangan, counsel for Titan Construction
Corporation, presented certain documents submitted by First United Construction
Corporation during the bidding conducted on the Bahay Pangarap Project. Among those presented as evidence in court
was the alleged “Certification” dated
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
This is to certify that FIRST UNITED CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION has undertaken building const’n,
sewerage, water, and other civil works for the following on-going projects of
Titan Construction Corporation
Title Cost
1. Calapan Super Area P 8,900,000.00
2.
3. Catarman Super Area 12,000,000.00
Titan Construction Corporation
by: (Sgd.)
President[5]
According to Atty. Linsangan, he had presented a copy of said certification to
the officers of Titan Construction Corporation, and upon verification learned
that the projects mentioned in said certification were never undertaken by
First United Construction Corporation.
He was likewise informed by the same officers that the signature on the
said certification was not the signature of the former President of Titan
Construction Corporation, Vicente Liwag.
Another witness, Jose Caneo, testified that he is the Vice President for Special
Projects of Titan Construction Corporation since 1981 and that petitioner and
his father, Felipe Dizon, were his former
co-employees and had worked with them.
He alleged that petitioner, as the possessor of the questioned
certification, which petitioner himself submitted to the PEA in support of
their bid, must be presumed to be the author and/or perpetrator of the
falsification, and that he presumes it must be the petitioner who delivered the
certification to the PEA as the certification was among the records of the First
United Construction Corporation where the petitioner was one of its
officers. He further claimed that he has
no personal knowledge as to who affixed the forged signature on the document.
For the defense, petitioner and his
father testified. From their
testimonies, it was discerned that petitioner is a civil engineer by profession
and had worked with the National Housing Authority from 1978 to 1981. He was likewise an employee of Titan
Construction Corporation as office engineer before he accepted overseas
employment in
The petitioner
claimed that he had no part in the preparation of said document, and neither
does he have knowledge as to who signed said certification, as his father only
informed him that the certification came from Jose Caneo. He also disclosed that he does not know Mr.
Vicente Liwag.
Petitioner also admitted that the First United Construction Corporation
had no part in the completion of the three projects referred to in the
certification, but nonetheless allowed his engineers, specifically, Myleen Hizon, to include said
certificate in the documents submitted for their pre-qualification bid thinking
that the signature appearing therein was genuine. According to petitioner, he only used the
questioned certification due to the belief that the Titan Construction
Corporation had authorized its use, and only came to know of the alleged
forgery of the signature appearing in said document when the criminal case was
filed against him. Furthermore,
petitioner maintained that the reason the criminal case was filed against him
was due to his refusal to pay the ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00)
demanded of him by Jose Caneo and Benito Yao, said amount representing the expected profit from the Bahay Pangarap
Project.
Felipe Dizon, father of the petitioner, on his part, testified
that he was employed by Titan Construction Corporation from 1981 until 1991,
and was both vice president and project manager of said corporation in
1986. He stated that his son requested
him to secure a certification to the effect that he had done some construction
work in order to help him take part in public biddings, and explained that he
found nothing wrong with this request as this was an ordinary practice of
construction companies, the same having been done by Titan Construction Corporation
when it was starting. In order to secure
said certification, he approached Jose Caneo and
conveyed his son’s request. Jose Caneo then told him to prepare the certification and he
will have the same signed by Vicente Liwag. Thereafter, he asked one of the employees of
Titan Construction Corporation to type said certification, choosing the
projects to be mentioned therein as said projects were known to him as vice
president and project manager. He
asserted that when Jose Caneo gave him the certification
two weeks later, he was of the belief that the signature appearing thereon was
genuine; otherwise, he would not have given the same to his son. Also, Felipe Dizon
claimed that the case was filed as a result of the disqualification of Titan
Construction Corporation from the public bidding for the Bahay Pangarap Project, and that he was
informed by Benito Yao that the case will be
withdrawn if his son paid ten million pesos representing the expected profit
from said project.
On rebuttal,
Jose Caneo countered that he was never approached by
Felipe Dizon to have any certification signed by
Vicente Liwag and likewise denied demanding any
amount from the petitioner for the withdrawal of the case.
After trial and
a perusal of the evidence presented, the trial court concluded that petitioner,
then the Executive Vice President of First United Construction Corporation, in
his desire to join public biddings, requested his father to secure a
certification that would show that he had participated in some of the projects
of Titan Construction Corporation, knowing fully well that he in fact had not
participated in any of Titan Construction Corporation’s projects. His father, in turn gave the petitioner a
certification allegedly from Titan Construction Corporation declaring that
First United Construction Corporation had participated in the construction of
the three projects mentioned therein.
The said certification was material to enable First United Construction
Corporation to qualify for the pre-qualification bid for the Bahay Pangarap
Project of the PEA. As a result of the
submission of said certification, First United Construction Corporation
pre-qualified and was thereafter awarded the project, causing the other
bidders, including Titan Construction Corporation, to lose and thus, sustain
loss.
Consequently,
the trial court rendered a judgment of conviction on
From
the foregoing evidences (sic) it would appear that the accused Fernando Dizon caused it to appear in the certification that the
President of Titan Construction Corporation, Mr. Vicente Liwag
participated in the act of issuing the said document. His admission to the effect that he caused
the securing of the certification for the purpose of submitting the same to the
Public Estates Authority (PEA) as part of the pre-qualification requirements in
the bidding. In the case of People vs.
Domingo, 49 Phil 28; People vs. Manansala, 105 Phil
1253, the possessor of the falsified document is presumed to be the author
thereof, and the one who stands to benefit therefrom
is presumed to be the author thereof. He
admitted requesting his father to secure the said certification. He likewise admitted that he has no
participation in anyone of the projects mentioned therein. That despite such knowledge of falsity of the
contents of the document he accepted and allowed the same to be used for the
pre-qualification bidding before the PEA.
His
admission to the effect that said certification was necessary to pre-qualify
his company to participate in the bidding for government projects knowing fully
well its falsity shows his intent to misrepresent facts and/or pervert the
truth in the narration of fact contained in the certification with a wrongful
intent to injure and/or damage third person.
The
Court hardly believe[s] the defense of the accused that one Benito Yao was extorting money from him in the amount of P10,000,000.00
on the promise that the case would be withdrawn. The records of the Titan Construction
Corporation duly registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission does
not show on record that Benito Yao is a stockholder,
director, or officer of the said company.
In view of all the foregoing, the Court finds the
accused FERNANDO S. DIZON guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Falsification of Private Document as defined and penalized under Art. 172, par. 2 in relation to Art. 171, par. 2 and 4 thereof
and hereby sentences him to imprisonment of Two (2) YEARS, Four (4) Months and
One (1) Day to Six (6) Years and a fine of P5,000.00.[6]
Aggrieved,
petitioner appealed the conviction before the Court of Appeals. On
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that, absent any
aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, appellant FERNANDO S. DIZON is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of arresto mayor, minimum term, to FOUR (4) YEARS, NINE (9)
MONTHS and TEN (10) DAYS of prision correccional, as maximum term. All other aspects of the appealed decision
stay.[7]
Petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration was subsequently denied; hence, the instant
petition.
Petitioner
asserts that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the judgment of conviction
because the prosecution failed to adduce any proof to substantiate the
allegation that petitioner was involved in the preparation of the falsified
certification, and that the sole basis of the conviction was the legal
presumption that the possessor of the falsified document is presumed to be the
author thereof. Petitioner argues that
for said presumption to take hold, it must first be shown that the questioned
document is a forgery or was indeed falsified.
According to petitioner, the foregoing is not true in the instant case
because the State failed to introduce satisfactory evidence of the forgery or
falsification of the certification, as well as to establish that the said
certification was unauthorized. Petitioner
rationalizes that while it is true that, other than the signature of the
president of Titan Construction Corporation, the representations made in the
certification are false, it does not necessarily follow that its execution was
unauthorized by Titan Construction Corporation.
He further justifies that there is evidence in record that attests to a
furtive practice in the construction industry where certifications, of the kind
involved in this case, are issued by established construction corporations to
assist new construction firms to pre-qualify in public biddings.
Petitioner also
stresses that, based on his testimony and that of his father,
it has been satisfactorily shown that he had no participation in the drafting
and issuance of the certification.
Petitioner explains that the certification was prepared by his father,
Felipe Dizon, who was then still an officer of Titan
Construction Corporation, and that through an intermediary,
Felipe Dizon arranged to have the certification
signed by the president of Titan Construction Corporation, Vicente Liwag. Thereafter,
Felipe Dizon delivered the signed certification to
his son. Petitioner maintains that with
his father’s admission of complicity, it was tenuous for both the trial court
and the appellate court to hold that petitioner is the forger of the
certification.
In order
to properly address the issues presented by petitioner, it is necessary that we
discuss the elements of the crime of Falsification
of Private Document under the Revised Penal Code which the petitioner has
been accused of perpetrating. The elements of Falsification under Paragraph
2 of Article 172 are as follows:
1.
That the offender
committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in par. 7, enumerated
in Art. 171;
2.
That the
falsification was committed in any private document;
3.
That the
falsification caused damage to a third party or at least the falsification was
committed with intent to cause such damage.
Under Article
171, par. 2, a person may commit falsification of a private document by causing
it to appear in a document that a person or persons participated in an act or
proceeding, when such person or persons did not in fact so participate in the
act or proceeding. On the other hand,
falsification under par. 4 of Article 171 is perpetrated by a person who,
having a legal obligation to disclose the truth, makes in a document statements
in a narration of facts which are absolutely false with the wrongful intent of
injuring a third person.
In order that
petitioner may be convicted of falsification under par. 2 of Article 171, it is
essential that it be proved beyond reasonable doubt that he had caused it to
appear that Mr. Vicente Liwag had authorized the
issuance of said certification, when in truth, Mr. Liwag
did not partake in said issuance of the certificate. Stated differently, for petitioner to be
convicted of falsification under par. 2, the allegation in the Information that
he “willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously prepare a document, to wit: a
certification dated July 10, 1986, by stating and making it appear in said
document x x x that the
same was executed and signed by the President of Titan Construction
Corporation, when in truth and in fact, as said accused well knew that said
certification was not issued nor authorized to be issued by Titan Construction
Corporation x x x and that
the signature appearing in said certification as being that of Titan
Construction Corporation’s President, x x x” must be clearly established.
The threshold
issue then is whether the signature of Mr. Vicente Liwag
was forged. Contrary to the findings of
the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, this Court deems that the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, Atty. Jaime Linsangan
and Jose Caneo, failed to prove with moral certainty
that Mr. Liwag did not authorize the issuance of the
certification.
As a
general rule, findings of fact by the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are given great respect and even regarded with finality by this Court;
however, this rule accepts of certain exceptions, such as 1) when the findings
are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; 2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; 3) when there is
grave abuse of discretion; 4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension
of facts; 5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; 6) when in making its
findings, the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; 7) when the findings are contrary to the trial
court; 8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; 9) when the facts set forth in the petition
as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; 10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence
of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or 11) when the Court
of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.[8] Particularly in criminal cases where the
accused stands to lose his liberty upon conviction, the Court must be content
that the findings of fact and the conclusions drawn by the lower courts leading
to his conviction must satisfy the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
The conviction
of petitioner was anchored on the testimonies of Atty. Linsangan
that he was informed by the officers of Titan Construction Corporation that the
signature appearing on the certification was not the signature of the
corporation president Vicente Liwag; and of Jose Caneo that he has no personal knowledge as to who actually
affixed the signature on the certification and that he presumes it to be the
petitioner. He (Caneo)
assumes that it must be petitioner who was in possession of the document as he
presumes that it must be petitioner who delivered the certification to the PEA
as the certification was among the records submitted by First United
Construction Corporation, where the petitioner was one of the officers.
From the
foregoing, the Court holds that the prosecution fell short of sufficiently
ascertaining that the signature appearing in the certification was, in fact,
not that of Mr. Vicente Liwag, much less, that
petitioner is the author of the certification.
Atty. Linsangan was merely informed that the signature appearing in
the certification was not that of Mr. Liwag. On the other hand, Jose Caneo
only presumed that petitioner was the
possessor of the alleged falsified document as he assumed that it was
petitioner who delivered the certification to the PEA. Jose Caneo’s
presumption was, however, directly demolished by the cross-examination of Atty.
Crescini:
Atty. Crescini: Mr. Caneo, I address your
attention to paragraph 8 of your affidavit complaint which reads: “that being
in possession of the said certification which he himself submitted to the PEA
in support of their bid, the said Fernando S. Dizon
is presumed to be the author/perpetrator of the said falsification.” You remember this allegation of this
affidavit-complaint?
Mr. Caneo: Yes, sir.
Q: I understand
and take it therefore that your only conclusion in believing that the
certification Annex A of your affidavit complaint was falsified by the accused
is because he was allegedly in possession of the same?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: It
actually therefore also goes [to say that] you did not actually see him prepare
physically the certification Annex A, you did not see it?
A: I did not see.
Q: You have no
personal knowledge as to who affix(ed) the signature
on Annex A purporting to be the signature of the President. You did not see it also?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You
have no personal knowledge of who affix(ed) the
signature?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: As
a matter of fact, when you claimed that Mr. Dizon was
the one who himself submitted to the PEA this certification, Annex A, you only
presumed it was he who personally delivered it?
A: Yes,
sir.
Q: You
did not see him in person actually in the act of delivering that certification
to the PEA?
A: Yes,
sir.
Q: You only
presumed he was the one who delivered it because the certification was among
the records of the FUCC?
A: Yes,
sir.
Q: And you
further made the presumption because Mr. Dizon is an
officer of FUCC?
A: Yes,
sir.
Q: That’s
all you know, your presumptions?
A: Yes, sir.[9]
Thus,
the presumption then of Jose Caneo is totally devoid
of any basis.
From
the foregoing it is clear that Atty. Linsangan and
Jose Caneo had no personal knowledge as to the matter
they testified to. The testimony of
Atty. Linsangan merely established that he was
informed by certain officers of Titan Construction Corporation that the
signature of Vicente Liwag appearing on the
certification was forged, however, the said officers where never presented
during trial to prove such claim of forgery.
When evidence is based on what was supposedly told the witness, the same
is without any evidentiary weight being patently hearsay.[10] On the other hand, the testimony of Jose Caneo was based on mere presumptions and speculations, and
bare assumptions and speculations cannot be bases for conviction.[11] A
conviction for a criminal offense must be based on clear and positive evidence
and not on mere assumptions.[12] Thus, the reliance by the lower court on the hearsay
and speculative testimonies of the abovecited witnesses, is
misplaced.
By and large, there
was no competent evidence to prove the allegation of the officers of Titan
Construction Corporation that the signature affixed on the certification was
not that of Vicente Liwag, thus making the issuance
of the certification unauthorized. The
prosecution did not present Mr. Vicente Liwag, or any
other knowledgeable witness to testify whether the signature appearing on said
certification was indeed not by Mr. Liwag, thus
establishing the fact that the certification was falsified by making it appear
that the issuance was actually consented to by the president of Titan
Construction Corporation. Absent clear
proof that Vicente Liwag did not sanction the
issuance of said certification, the Information that petitioner has committed
falsification of private document under Article 172, in relation to par. 2,
Article 171, cannot be considerably proved.
With respect to
par. 4 of Article 171, what is sought to be penalized is the act of making in a
document of utterly false narration of facts by a person who has a legal obligation
to disclose the truth of said facts, thereby causing injury to a third
party. And in the case at bar, in order
that petitioner may be penalized under par. 4, it is necessary that the
allegations in the Information that “x x x accused, with intent to damage Titan Construction
Corporation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously prepare
a document, to wit: a certification dated July 10, 1986, by stating and making
it appear in said document that the First United Construction Corporation has
undertaken building construction, sewage, water, and other civil works, for the
following projects of Titan Construction Corporation: 1.Calapan Super Area Shop
– P8,900,000.00; 2.Masbate Super Area Shop – P9,800,000.00;
3.Catarman Super Area Shop – P12,000,000.00 x x
x, when in truth and in fact, as said accused well
knew x x x that it is false
because First United Construction Corporation never had any participation of
the projects listed therein which were undertaken by Titan Construction Corporation
x x x, to the damage and
prejudice of Titan Construction Corporation” be proved.
According to the
court a quo, it has been substantially gathered from the evidence
adduced in trial that:
. . . [A]ccused Fernando Dizon, then the Executive Vice-President of the First
United Construction Corporation, in his desire to be able to join public
biddings, requested his father Felipe Dizon to secure
a certification to the effect that he has participated in certain projects of
the Titan Construction Corporation, knowing fully well that he has no
participation whatsoever on said projects.
That the father in turn gave the son a certification from the Titan
Construction Corporation to the effect that he has participated in the
construction of the three (3) projects mentioned therein. That the said certification
is material to enable him to qualify the pre-qualification bid for the Bahay Pangarap Project. That because of the certification submitted,
he actually pre-qualified and was awarded the project. That the same caused the
other bidders to lose in the bid, hence damage is present.[13]
From the
foregoing, the trial court concluded that the elements of the crime of
falsification under par. 4 of Article 171 necessary to convict petitioner,
particularly that a) the offender makes in a document statements in a narration
of facts; b) that he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts
narrated by him; c) that the fact narrated by the offender are absolutely
false; and d) that the perversion of the truth in the narration of fact was
made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person are present in the
instant case.
The Court of
Appeals, in sustaining the trial court, further stressed that petitioner admitted
in court that he had requested his father to secure a certification from the
Titan Construction Corporation declaring that First United Construction
Corporation had done some construction work for the former; that said
certification was necessary for First United Construction Corporation to qualify
in public biddings for government projects; and that petitioner knew fully well
the falsity in said statements. Said
acts of the accused caused damage not only to Titan Construction Corporation
which suffered when it lost in the bidding, but also to the State which
expected faithful compliance with the requirements of prequalification, bids,
and awards on government infrastructure contracts as provided under
Presidential Decree No. 1594.
This Court is not
convinced. In the case at bar, the
circumstances relied upon by the trial court do not lead to an inference
exclusively consistent with the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable
doubt. The prosecution failed to prove
that it was indeed petitioner who prepared the
document nor that he was the one who provided the facts contained in the
certification. Even from the admissions
of both petitioner and his father, what can only be established is that
petitioner requested his father to secure a certification that they had done some construction work for Titan
Construction Corporation. Nothing in
said testimony indicates that petitioner had asked his father to commit any
falsification. Petitioner did not provide nor even suggest
what detailed information will be included in said certification.
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
merely inferred that by virtue of petitioner’s position as Executive Vice President
of First United Construction Corporation, he was in possession of said document
and thus can be presumed to be the author of said falsification. There is
nothing in the evidence to support a positive conclusion that petitioner was
actually in possession of the falsified document.
Even the presumption
that the person who is benefited by the falsified document is presumed to be
the author, cannot be applied in this case. Petitioner was not directly benefited by the
certificate. It must be pointed out here
that the said certification benefited First United Construction Corporation
which was granted the construction project, and petitioner was merely an
officer of said company and any benefit he may have received from said project
would only have been incidental.
From the totality of
evidence presented before the Court, it cannot, with propriety and due respect
for the law, be held that there is sufficiency of competent evidence on which
to base an affirmative finding of guilt in relation to the requisite degree of
moral certainty. The Court finds the testimonies and documents for the
prosecution rather weak. While there may be inherent weaknesses for the
defense, at most, the proofs in this case only cast suspicion on petitioner. The principle has been dinned into the ears of
the bench and the bar that in this jurisdiction, accusation is not synonymous
with guilt. While the Court is not inclined to hold that the evidence is
conclusive that he is not guilty, neither is it convinced that he is so, based
on the circumstances of this case. The Court is, thus, under a long
standing legal injunction to resolve the doubt in favor of herein
petitioner. So long as the acts of the petitioner and the circumstances
can be explained upon any other reasonable hypothesis inconsistent with his
guilt, he must be acquitted.
To emphasize, the
foundation of the ruling of acquittal is reasonable doubt, which simply means
that the prosecution’s evidence was not sufficient to sustain the guilt of the
petitioner beyond the point of moral certainty – certainty that convinces and
satisfies the reason and the conscience of those who are to act upon it.[14]
It is such proof to the satisfaction of the court, keeping in mind the
presumption of innocence, as precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that
which it is given to support it. An acquittal based on reasonable doubt
will prosper even though the accused’s innocence may
be doubted,[15]
for a criminal conviction rests on the strength of the evidence of the
prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense.[16]
And, if the inculpatory
facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which
is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with
his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and
is not sufficient to support a conviction,[17]
and, thus, that which is favorable to the accused should be considered.[18]
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20143, dated 29 November 1999, affirming the Decision dated 22 April
1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay, Branch
109, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Instead, a new one is entered ACQUITTING
petitioner Fernando S. Dizon of the crime of Falsification of Private Document as
defined and penalized under Art. 172, par. 2, in relation to
Art. 171, par. 4, of the Revised Penal Code, on
reasonable doubt. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
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ROMEO J.
CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
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Pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN Chief Justice |
[1] CA-G.R. CR No. 20143, dated
[2] Crim.
Case No. 91-0716 dated
[3] Rollo, pp. 114-115.
[4] Civil Case No. 91-213 entitled, “Titan Construction Corporation and Fernando M. Sopot v. Atty. Luis B. Pangilinan, Jr., as Chairman, Engineer Manuel Berina, Atty. Dan Amosin and Mr. Pelayo Laplap, as members of the Pre-Post Qualification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) and the Public Estates Authority.”
[5] Rollo, p. 116.
[6] RTC
Decision, pp. 11-13; rollo, pp. 124-126.
[7] CA
Decision, p.18; rollo, p. 92.
[8] Spouses Almendrala
v. Spouses Wing On Ngo, G.R. No. 142408,
[9] TSN,
[10] People v. Sarabia, 376 Phil. 32, 43 (1999).
[11] Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, 357 Phil. 762, 808 (1998).
[12] Gaerlan v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 57876,
[13] Rollo, p. 123.
[14]
People
v. Salguero,
G.R. No. 89117,
[15] People v. Fronda, 384 Phil. 732, 743 (2000).
[16]
[17] People v. Ale, 229 Phil. 81, 93-94 (1986).
[18] People v. Bautista, 81 Phil. 78, 80 (1948).